Viktor Slapak v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-4-2013 
Viktor Slapak v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Viktor Slapak v. Attorney General United States" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1426. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1426 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2638 
___________ 
 
VIKTOR SLAPAK,  
                                  Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
                                 Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-647-600) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Charles M. Honeyman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2013 
Before:  SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: January 4, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Viktor Slapak seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟ (“BIA” or 
“Board”) final order of removal.  In its order, the BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge‟s 
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(“IJ”) decision to deny his application for withholding of removal.  We will deny the 
petition for review. 
  Slapak, a native and citizen of the Czech Republic, was admitted to the United 
States on a visitor‟s visa in March 2006, and overstayed.  The Department of Homeland 
Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging Slapak with removability under INA  
§ 237(a)(1)(B).  Slapak conceded his removability and filed an application for asylum 
and withholding of removal based on his fear of being persecuted in the Czech Republic 
because of his perceived Roma ethnicity.
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 Slapak testified that because of his dark skin and other physical characteristics, 
many in the Czech Republic believe that he is Roma.  Although Slapak‟s mother is part 
Roma, Slapak does not identify as Roma himself.  Slapak testified that he experienced 
harassment as a child because of his appearance and, around age fifteen, he was the target 
of ethnic epithets and a beating.  Slapak believes that he will face persecution upon his 
return to the Czech Republic by neo-Nazi groups.  An expert witness, Krista Marie 
Hegburg, testified about the marginalization and discrimination that Roma people 
experience in the Czech Republic.  She also described a rise in violence against Roma in 
recent years and opined that the Czech government is unwilling to control it. 
 The IJ pretermitted Slapak‟s asylum application because, as Slapak had earlier 
conceded, his application was statutorily time-barred and there were no changed or 
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  Alternatively, Slapak requested voluntary departure, which the IJ granted. 
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extraordinary circumstances to excuse its untimely filing.  See Administrative Record 
(“A.R.”) at 39; INA § 208(a)(2)(B)&(D).  The IJ then denied Slapak‟s application for 
withholding of removal.  Although Slapak testified credibly, the IJ determined that 
Slapak was unable to establish that a pattern or practice of persecution exists against 
Roma in the Czech Republic that is systemic, pervasive, or organized.
 
   
 Slapak appealed the IJ‟s decision to the BIA and, in an order dated May 17, 2012, 
the Board dismissed Slapak‟s administrative appeal.  The Board agreed with the IJ that 
Slapak had not demonstrated his eligibility for withholding of removal.  This petition for 
review followed. 
 This Court has authority to review final orders of removal.  See 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(a).  “[W]hen the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the 
bases for the IJ‟s decision, we have authority to review the decisions of both the IJ and 
the BIA.”  Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  The BIA‟s factual 
determinations must be upheld if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and 
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 
478, 481 (1992).  
 In his petition for review, Slapak argues that his due process rights were violated 
when the IJ and BIA failed to fully consider the evidence that he submitted before 
denying his application for withholding of removal.  Having reviewed the administrative 
record, we conclude that contrary to Slapak‟s assertion, the agency‟s review comported 
with principles of due process.  We have held that the BIA “„is not required to write an 
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exegesis on every contention,‟ but only to show that it has reviewed the record and 
grasped the movant‟s claims.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citation omitted, quoting Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 908 (7th Cir. 2000)).  Although 
Slapak argues that the agency failed to consider the affidavit of Paul St. Clair, the 
Executive Director of the Roma Community Center in Toronto, and the U.S. State 
Department materials, these items were considered.  Indeed, at the start of his decision, 
the IJ observed that Slapak had submitted State Department materials as well as expert 
reports.  The IJ later noted that based upon those materials, he was unable to conclude 
that the Roma people experience systemic or pervasive persecution.  The BIA agreed 
with those findings on appeal.  Although Slapak may disagree with the agency‟s 
conclusions, his claim that his materials were not adequately considered is without merit. 
Slapak also argues that the agency erred in determining that he failed to establish 
that a pattern or practice of persecution exists against Roma people in the Czech 
Republic.  To establish a fear of future persecution, an applicant must demonstrate that he 
“„has a genuine fear, and that a reasonable person in [his] circumstances would fear 
persecution if returned to [his] native country.‟”  Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 
592 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002)).  This 
requires that a petitioner show that he would be individually singled out for persecution 
or demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly situated individuals.  Lie 
v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005).  “[T]o constitute a „pattern or practice,‟ the 
persecution of the group must be „systemic, pervasive, or organized.‟”  Id. at 537 
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(quoting Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 991 (8th Cir.2004)).  In addition, the acts of 
persecution must be committed by the government or forces the government is either 
unable or unwilling to control.  Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637 (3d Cir. 
2006).   
 Slapak‟s claim is not that he would be singled out for persecution upon return to 
the Czech Republic, see A.R. at 239, but that there is a “pattern or practice” of 
discrimination against those of Roma ethnicity.  In rejecting Slapak‟s pattern or practice 
claim, the BIA found that the documentary evidence did not establish systemic, 
pervasive, or organized persecution against Roma people living in the Czech Republic.  
Substantial evidence supports the BIA‟s finding. 
 Although Slapak‟s expert, Hegburg, testified about the recent rise in violent 
attacks against the Roma, the 2008 State Department Human Rights Report states only 
that “[l]atent societal discrimination against the country‟s Romani population 
occasionally manifested itself in violence.”  A.R. at 333.  Overwhelmingly, the 
documentary evidence describes what amounts to institutional discrimination against the 
country‟s Roma population.  However, discrimination does not necessarily constitute 
persecution.  See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 233 n.20 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that 
courts routinely deny immigration relief to persons “who suffer racial discrimination that 
falls short of „persecution‟”).  While incidents of violence may be on the rise as Hegburg 
suggests, based on the record presented, a reasonable adjudicator could conclude, based 
on the record presented, that Slapak failed to establish systemic or pervasive persecution 
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of Roma people in the Czech Republic.  Cf. Sioe Tjen Wong v. Att‟y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 
234 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that “the BIA properly reviewed the record and determined 
that violence was not sufficiently widespread and incidents of harassment and 
discrimination were not sufficiently severe to constitute a pattern or practice of 
persecution”). 
  For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review.    
